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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate the possible privacy and secu-
rity threats to RFID systems, and consider whether previ-
ously proposed RFID protocols address these threats. We
then propose a new authentication protocol which provides
the identified privacy and security features and is also ef-
ficient. The new protocol resists tag information leakage,
tag location tracking, replay attacks, denial of service at-
tacks, backward traceability, forward traceability (under an
assumption), and server impersonation (also under an as-
sumption). We also show that it requires less tag-side stor-
age and computation than other similarly structured RFID
protocols.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information




RFID, authentication, security, privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic Identification and Data Capture (AIDC) cov-
ers methods for automatically identifying objects, collecting
data about them, and entering that data directly into com-
puter systems [25]. It has become widespread in a broad
range of markets, including Point of Sale (POS), warehouse
management and logistics, product tracking in a supply chain,
passports, transport payments, livestock identification, au-
tomated vehicle identification, library book check-in/check-
out and patient identification in hospitals [22, 25].
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless AIDC
technology that uses radio signals to identify a product, an-
imal or person [8, 22]. The three main components of an
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RFID system are RFID tags, RFID readers and a back-end
server. A tag is an identification device attached to an item,
which uses radio frequency (RF) to communicate [9]. The
reader is a device that can recognise the presence of RFID
tags and read the information supplied by them [9]. The
reader queries tags by broadcasting an RF signal, and the
tag responds to the reader with a number or other identify-
ing information [22]. The reader forwards the tag response
to a back-end server. The server has a database of tags and
can retrieve detailed information regarding the tag (or the
item attached to the tag) from the tag response.
The main benefits of RFID systems are that they can
provide automated and multiple identification capture and
system analysis, can read several tags in the field at the
same time automatically, and can help to track valuable ob-
jects [2]. However, they can threaten the privacy of the
owner carrying the tag as a result of automatic identifica-
tion [3]; more specifically, tag information could be disclosed
to unauthorised readers, and multiple readers could cooper-
ate to track the movements of a tag [3, 24]. In addition,
many possible security threats arise from the use of wireless
communications. Moreover, it is infeasible to use computa-
tionally intensive cryptographic algorithms for privacy and
security, because memory and processing power in a low-
cost tag are limited [3]. Therefore, authentication protocols
for RFID systems should not only be designed to address
these privacy and security threats, but should also take into
account the limited capabilities of RFID tags.
In this paper, we first consider the privacy issues and se-
curity threats applying to RFID systems, and also discuss
the accompanying performance issues. Section 3 reviews re-
lated work and examines weaknesses in existing schemes.
Next, we propose a new authentication protocol designed
to address the identified privacy and security requirements,
whilst also preserving desirable performance characteristics.
Section 5 analyses the protocol and compares it to the prior
art. The final section summarises the results.
2. REQUIREMENTS FORRFID PROTOCOLS
2.1 Privacy
One of the main concerns for RFID systems is privacy.
RFID systems use a shared radio medium which allows eaves-
dropping. Unprotected communications between tags and
readers over a wireless channel can disclose information about
the tags and their positions. We identify the following two
major privacy issues.
• Tag Information Privacy: In a typical RFID sys-
tem, when an RFID reader queries an RFID tag, it
responds by sending its identifier to the reader; the
reader can then request further details by sending this
identifier to a server. If unauthorised readers can also
get a tag identifier, then they may be able to deter-
mine the additional information related to the tag. For
example, if the information associated with a tag at-
tached to a passport, ID-card or medical record could
be obtained by any reader, then the damage would be
very serious. To protect against such information leak-
age, RFID systems need to be controlled so that only
authorised readers are able to access the information
associated with a tag.
• Tag Location Privacy: If the responses of a tag are
linkable to each other or distinguishable from those of
other tags, then the location of a tag could be tracked
by multiple collaborating tag readers. For example, if
the response of a tag to a reader query is a static ID
code, then the movements of the tag can be monitored,
and the social interactions of an individual carrying a
tag may be available to third parties without him or
her knowing. If messages from tags are anonymous,
then the tag tracking problem can be avoided.
2.2 Security
We classify security threats to RFID protocols into weak
and strong attacks.
2.2.1 Weak attacks
These are attacks which are feasible just by observing and
manipulating communications between readers and tags.
• Tag Impersonation: An eavesdropper could imper-
sonate a target tag without knowing the tag’s internal
secrets. It could communicate with readers instead of
the tag and be authenticated as the tag.
• Replay attack: In such an attack, an attacker reuses
communications from previous sessions to perform a
successful authentication between a tag and a server.
• Denial of Service attack: An adversary disturbs
the interactions between readers and tags by intercept-
ing or blocking messages transmitted. Such an attack
could cause a server and a tag to lose synchronisation.
For example, the server might update the shared data,
while the tag does not; in such a case they would no
longer be able to authenticate each other.
2.2.2 Strong attacks
These are threats possible for an attacker which has com-
promised a target tag. The memory of a low-cost tag is
not tamper-resistant, and hence the tag’s internal data are
liable to be exposed by physical attacks. Thus addressing
such attacks is essential for the security of RFID schemes.
• Backward Traceability: This occurs if, given all the
internal state of a target tag at time t, the attacker is
able to identify target tag interactions that occurred
at a time t′ < t [15]. That is, knowledge of a tag’s cur-
rent internal state could help identify the tag’s past
interactions, and the past transcripts of a tag may al-
low tracking of the tag owner’s past behaviour [15].
In some previous papers, backward untraceability is re-
ferred to as forward security [5, 7, 12, 18]. Here we
use the terms backward traceability and forward trace-
ability defined as in [15] to clearly distinguish between
threats to past and future anonymity.
• Forward Traceability: This can similarly be defined
as where knowledge of a tag’s internal state at time t
can help to identify tag interactions that occur at a
time t′ > t [15]. The only way of maintaining future
security once the current tag secrets have been revealed
is to detect key compromise as soon as possible, and to
replace the exposed key to protect future transactions
[15]. This issue is related to tag ownership transfer.
This is because, if an RFID scheme does not provide
forward untraceability, when the ownership of a tag is
transferred, the previous owners might be able to read
communications between the new owner and the tag.
• Server Impersonation: This means that an adver-
sary with knowledge of the internal state of a tag is
able to impersonate the valid server to the tag. This
attack does not appear to have been discussed previ-
ously, despite its potential importance.
One reason that this is a genuine threat is because of
the following attack. If it is possible to impersonate
a server to a tag, an adversary could request a target
tag to update its shared secrets. The tag and the real
server would then be desynchronised, and incapable of
successful communications.
2.3 Performance
RFID schemes cannot use computationally intensive cryp-
tographic algorithms for privacy and security because tight
tag cost requirements make tag-side resources (such as pro-
cessing power and storage) scarce.
• Capacity minimisation: The volume of data stored
in a tag should be minimised because of the limited
size of tag memory.
• Computation minimisation: Tag-side computations
should be minimised because of the very limited power
available to a tag.
• Communication compression: The volume of data
that each tag can transmit per second is limited by the
bandwidth available for RFID tags [3, 18].
• Scalability: The server should be able to handle grow-
ing amounts of work in a large tag population. It
should be able to identify multiple tags using the same
radio channel [11]. Performing an exhaustive search to
identify individual tags could be difficult when the tag
population is large [13].
3. RELATEDWORK
Hash-based Access Control (HAC), as defined by Weis et
al. [24], is a scheme which involves locking a tag using a
one-way hash function. A locked tag uses the hash of a ran-
dom key as its metaID. When locked, a tag responds to all
queries with its metaID. However, the scheme allows a tag
to be tracked because the same metaID is used repeatedly
[5]. Weis et al. also suggest another scheme, Randomized
Access Control (RAC), which employs a random number
generator to prevent the above tracking attack. In each ses-
sion, a tag generates a new response as a hash function of
the tag ID and a random number. However, tag imper-
sonation remains possible because an intercepted response
can be replayed. Moreover, it does not provide backward
untraceability because the tag ID is fixed.
Ohkubo, Suzki, and Kinoshita (OSK) [18] propose an
RFID privacy protection scheme providing indistinguisha-
bility (i.e. a tag output is indistinguishable from a truly
random value and unlinkable to the ID of the tag) and back-
ward untraceability. This scheme uses a low-cost hash chain
mechanism to update tag secret information to provide these
two security properties. However, it is subject to replay at-
tacks [5], and hence it permits an adversary to impersonate
a tag without knowing the tag secrets.
Henrici and Mu¨ller (HM) [10] suggest a scheme relying
on one-way hash functions to enhance location privacy. A
tag sends two hashed values as its response to a query, and
updates its stored values, including its ID, after a successful
authentication. Despite this, the scheme still allows a de-
gree of tag tracking, because a tag always replies with the
same hashed ID before the next successful authentication
[5]. Also, a strong attacker could easily compute the iden-
tifiers used in previous sessions by combining the server’s
random number and the current identifier; that is, it does
not provide backward untraceability.
Molnar and Wagner (MW) [17] propose a private authen-
tication protocol for library RFID which uses a shared secret
and a pseudorandom number function to protect the mes-
sages communicated between tag and reader. This scheme
cannot provide backward untraceability. Once a tag is com-
promised, the attacker can trace past communications from
this tag [5], because a tag’s identifier and secret key are
static. They also build a new tree-based protocol to provide
scalable private authentication, with reader work O(logN),
O(logN) rounds of interaction, and O(logN) tag storage,
where N denotes the number of tags, and the N tags are
considered as leaves in a balanced binary tree [17]. How-
ever, this approach requires that each tag stores the dlogNe
secrets corresponding to the path from the root to the tag,
and privacy is weakened when an adversary is able to tam-
per with at least one tag [4, 19]. Also, the more tags an
adversary tampers with, the more privacy is exposed [19].
Dimitriou’s scheme (D) [6] is an RFID authentication pro-
tocol that enforces user privacy and protects against tag
cloning. This scheme uses a challenge-response approach,
where a tag uses a hash of its identifier as a response to a
reader query to maintain scalability at the server, and the
back-end server sends a message using the updated identifier
to the tag after receiving the tag response, to authenticate
the server to the tag. However, between valid sessions, the
tag identifier remains the same, thereby making the scheme
vulnerable to tracking and tag impersonation through reuse
of the hashed tag identifier. Additionally, the scheme is
prone to DoS attacks.
The identification scheme of Karthikeyan and Nesterenko
(KN) [11] uses simple matrix multiplication, and does not re-
quire computationally expensive cryptographic mechanisms.
Security is based on the difficulty of recovering the multipli-
cand or multiplier from the product of two matrices. An
intruder could launch a DoS attack and could also attempt
to mount a brute-force matrix or key guessing attack as dis-
cussed in [11]. In addition, the scheme cannot resist replay
and tracking attacks [5].
Duc et al. (DPLK) [7] present a synchronisation-based
communication protocol for the EPCGlobal Class 1 Gen-2
RFID tag. It uses a pseudo-random number generator and
a cyclic redundancy code. It cannot prevent replay attacks
before the next successful authentication. Most seriously, a
DoS attack could permanently desynchronise a server and a
tag [5]. It also does not provide backward untraceability if
the fixed EPC code and the access key PIN are compromised
[5].
A mutual authentication protocol for RFID conforming
to the EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standards was introduced
by Chien and Chen (CC) [5]. A challenge-response proto-
col is used to prevent replay attacks. The server database
maintains copies of both old and new tag keys to resist DoS
attacks. Both the authentication key and the access key are
updated after a successful session in order to give backward
untraceability. However, the scheme still permits backward
and forward traceability, because a strong attacker that com-
promises a tag can identify a tag’s past interactions from the
previous communications and the fixed EPC of the tag, and
can also read the tag’s future transactions. Moreover, an ad-
versary can successfully masquerade as an authorised server
to a tag if it has the tag secrets.
Lim and Kwon (LK) [15] describe an RFID authentication
scheme satisfying both forward and backward untraceability
and enabling perfect ownership transfer. They define update
as deterministic evolution (of stored secrets) and refresh as
probabilistic evolution, where the refresh process is intro-
duced to help provide forward untraceability. A tag and
a server both refresh their secrets using exchanged random
numbers if an authentication procedure completes success-
fully. If an authentication procedure fails, the tag updates
its secrets (i.e. using a deterministic process). The protocol
provides forward untraceability from the moment that an
adversary misses just one successful authentication session
after it has compromised the tag secret. It uses two hash
key chains: a forward key chain for tag secret evolution,
and a backward key chain, used in reverse order, for server
validation. These techniques make the scheme partially se-
cure against server impersonation. The database keeps old
and new key chains for relevant secrets in order to solve the
desynchronisation problem arising from DoS attacks. How-
ever, it does have potentially scalability issues, because the
server needs to perform significant computations to update
tag secrets, and a large database is required to manage two
key chains for each tag.
In this paper, we propose a scheme that significantly re-
duces the necessary storage and computation in a tag by
comparison with the DPLK, CC and LK schemes, as well as
preventing the attacks mentioned above.
4. A NOVEL AUTHENTICATION PROTO-
COL
4.1 Design Principle
The goals of our new protocol are to meet the privacy
and security requirements given in section 2, and also to
maximise performance efficiency.
Our protocol involves three flows, and uses a challenge-
response approach. It uses random numbers to give anonymity
for each tag response, as in the CC and LK protocols. The
server database stores both the most recent and the cur-
rent data for each tag to protect against desynchronisation
between the server and tags, like the HM, CC and LK pro-
tocols. If the authentication procedure is successful, then
the server and tag refresh their shared secrets probabilisti-
cally using exchanged random numbers, thereby providing
untraceability, as in the LK protocol.
One of the main features of the protocol is that a random
number generated by a tag serves as a temporary secret for
the tag. Another feature is that a tag only needs to store an
identifier, where this identifier is the cryptographic hash of a
bit-string assigned to the tag. A server database stores tag
bit-strings as well as tag identifiers. The bit-string is used for
server validation. The scheme is designed to minimise the
use of complex cryptographic functions, and instead wher-
ever possible uses combinations of simple functions such as




The protocol uses a hash function, a keyed hash function
(a message authentication code algorithm) and a pseudoran-
dom number generator.
Definition 1 A hash function h is an efficiently computable
function which maps an arbitrary length input to a
fixed length output; i.e. h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n [16, 25].
The basic requirements for a cryptographic hash func-
tion are [16, 25]:
• preimage resistance — for any output y, it is com-
putationally infeasible to find an input x such that
h(x) = y, given no corresponding input is known.
• 2nd-preimage resistance — given x, it is com-
putationally infeasible to find x′ 6= x such that
h(x) = h(x′).
• collision resistance — it is computationally infea-
sible to find any pair of distinct inputs x and x′
such that h(x) = h(x′).
Definition 2 A message authentication code (MAC) algo-
rithm is a family of functions fk parameterised by a
secret key k, with the following properties [16]:
• ease of computation — given a value k and an
input x, the MAC fk(x) is easy to compute.
• compression — fk maps an input x of arbitrary
finite bit-length to an output fk(x) of fixed bit-
length n.
• computation-resistance — given a sequence of text-
MAC pairs (xi, fk(xi)) for a fixed key k, it is com-
putationally infeasible to compute a text-MAC
pair (x, fk(x)) for any x 6= xi.
Definition 3 A pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is a
deterministic algorithm which, given a truly random
binary sequence of length k, outputs a binary sequence
of length l > k which “appears” to be random. The
input to the PRBG is called the seed, while the output
of the PRBG is called a pseudorandom bit sequence
[16].
4.2.2 Assumptions
Our protocol works under the following assumptions.
• Each tag has a unique initiator, which creates and
maintains security parameters for the tag.
• Each initiator maintains a secure database containing
a set of values for each tag that it manages.
• Each tag has a rewritable memory which may be sus-
ceptible to compromise.
• Every tag reader has a PRBG.
• The tags can generate random numbers and perform
a hash function and a keyed hash function.
• The channel between the server and the reader is se-
cure.
• The reader and the tags communicate over an inse-
cure channel and their communications are subject to
eavesdropping or modification.
Standardised cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-
1 are too expensive for use in today’s low-cost RFID tags
[14, 25]. Instead, the following methods could be adopted
to serve as hash functions. Weis [25] discusses using non-
linear feedback shift registers (NLFSRs) to build a low-cost
hash function, as NLFSRs require very few gates to imple-
ment (besides the register) [14]. Yu¨ksel [26] presents im-
plementations of low-cost hash functions for a block size of
64 bits [14]. A further potential alternative is the Whirlpool
hash function, which has been standardised by ISO/IEC and
evaluated by the New European Schemes for Signatures, In-
tegrity and Encryption (NESSIE) project [21]. Pramstaller
et al. [20] present a compact hardware implementation of
Whirlpool, which uses an innovative state representation
that makes it possible to significantly reduce the required
hardware resources.
A one-way function such as a cryptographic hash function,
or a block cipher can be used to generate pseudorandom bit
sequences [16]. In practice, an iterated keyed hash function
which takes a cheap and weak pseudorandom source (for
instance circuitry noise) and an internal key as its inputs
could be used as a PRBG [19, 23].
4.2.3 Notation
We use the following notation in the protocol description.
h A hash function, h : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l
fk A keyed hash function, fk : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l
(a MAC algorithm)
N The number of tags
l The bit-length of a tag identifier
Ti The i-th tag (1 ≤ i ≤ N)
Di The detailed information associated with tag Ti
ui A string of l bits assigned to Ti
ti Ti’s identifier of l bits, which equals h(ui)
xnew The new (refreshed) value of x
xold The most recent value of x





x k Right circular shift operator, which rotates all
bits of x to the right by k bits, as if the left and
right ends of x were joined.
x k Left circular shift operator, which rotates all
bits of x to the left by k bits, as if the left and
right ends of x were joined.
∈R The random choice operator, which randomly
selects an element from a finite set using a uniform
probability distribution
4.3 Protocol Description
The protocol is summarised in Figure 1.
4.3.1 Initialisation
The following steps must be performed by an initiator
prior to using the protocol.
• An initiator (e.g. the tag manufacturer) assigns a string
ui of l bits to each tag Ti, computes ti = h(ui), and
stores ti in the tag, where l should be large enough so
that an exhaustive search to find the l-bit values ti and
ui is computationally infeasible.
• The initiator stores the entries [(ui, ti)new, (ui, ti)old, Di]
for every tag that it manages. The first pair is for the
newly assigned values of ui and ti, the second pair is
for the previously assigned values, and Di is for the tag
information (e.g., price, date, etc.). Initially (ui, ti)new
is assigned the initial values of ui and ti, and (ui, ti)old
is set to null.
4.3.2 Authentication Process
1. Reader: A reader generates a random bit-string r1 ∈R
{0, 1}l and sends it to Ti.
2. Tag: The tag Ti generates a random bit-string r2 ∈R
{0, 1}l as a temporary secret for the session, and com-
putes M1 = ti ⊕ r2 and M2 = fti(r1 ⊕ r2). Ti then
sends M1 and M2 to the reader.
3. Reader: The reader transmits M1, M2 and r1 to the
server.
4. Server:
(a) The server searches its database using M1,M2
and r1 as follows.
i. It chooses ti from amongst the values ti(new)
or ti(old) stored in the database.
ii. It puts r2 ← M1 ⊕ ti, and computes M ′2 =
fti(r1 ⊕ r2).
iii. If M ′2 = M2, then it has identified and au-
thenticated Ti. It then goes to step (c). Oth-
erwise, it returns to step i.
(b) If no match is found, the server sends  to the
reader and stops the session.
(c) The server computes M3 = ui ⊕ (r2  l/2) and
sends it with Di to the reader.
(d) The server updates ui(old) and ti(old) for the tag
Ti to ui and ti respectively, and sets ui(new) ←
(ui  l/4) ⊕ (ti  l/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 and ti(new) ←
h(ui(new)).
5. Reader: The reader forwards M3 to Ti.
6. Tag: Ti computes ui ← M3 ⊕ (r2  l/2) and checks
that h(ui) = ti. If the check succeeds, the tag has
authenticated the server, and sets ti ← h((ui  l/4)⊕
(ti  l/4)⊕ r1 ⊕ r2). If the check fails, the tag keeps
the current value of ti unchanged.
5. ANALYSIS
5.1 Privacy and Security
The protocol has the following privacy and security prop-
erties.
• Tag Information Privacy: The detailed informa-
tion Di of tag Ti is stored in the database of the server,
which is assumed to be secure. A server and a reader
communicate via a secure channel. Only a legitimate
server can extract a tag identifier ti from the pair (M1,
M2) sent by Ti. The server will send Di to a reader im-
mediately after successful authentication of Ti. Thus,
only an authorised server and reader are able to access
the information associated with a tag.
• Tag Location Privacy: The responses of the tag
Ti are anonymous, since the tag only ever sends pairs
(M1, M2), which cannot be linked to any particular
tag. In other words, the eavesdropper can neither link
tag responses to previous responses from the same tag,
nor distinguish one tag’s responses from another’s. It
is thus difficult to track the location of a tag.
• Tag Impersonation attack: For a weak attacker to
impersonate Ti, it must be able to compute a valid
response (M1, M2) to a reader query. However, it is
hard to compute such a valid pair without knowledge
of ti. Of course, a strong attacker is able to clone a
tag.
• Replay attack: The scheme is a challenge-response
authentication protocol using random numbers to re-
sist replay attacks. The messages M1,M2 and M3 are
functions of freshly generated nonces r1 and r2, and
thus these messages cannot be reused in other sessions.
• Denial of Service attack: If an attacker prevents
the third flow from reaching the tag, the shared secrets
of the server and Ti might be out of synchronisation,
since the server will refresh ui and ti but the tag Ti
will keep the current ti. However, the server maintains
both the old and new values of ui and ti for each tag
Ti in its database, so that the server can resynchronise
with the tag in such a situation.
• Backward Traceability: A strong attacker cannot
identify the past interactions of Ti, even if it knows Ti’s
present internal state. That is, an attacker is unable
to discover the previous identifiers of Ti because they
are the cryptographic hashes of values not available to
the tag.
• Forward Traceability: The scheme provides forward
untraceability if a strong attacker misses M3 just once
in a single successful authentication session after com-
promising Ti’s secret. That is, if the attacker cannot
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
Server Reader Tag Ti
[(ui, ti)new, (ui, ti)old, Di] [ti]
r1 ∈R {0, 1}l
r1−−− → r2 ∈R {0, 1}l
M1 = ti ⊕ r2
M2 = fti (r1 ⊕ r2)
M1,M2,r1← −−− M1,M2← −−−
Search for a value ti for which
r2 ←M1 ⊕ ti and M2 = fti (r1 ⊕ r2)
M3 = ui ⊕ (r2  l/2)
Di,M3−−− → M3−−− →
ui(old) ← ui ui ←M3 ⊕ (r2  l/2)
ti(old) ← ti h(ui) ?= ti
ui(new) ← (ui  l/4)⊕ (ti  l/4)⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ti ← h((ui  l/4)⊕ (ti  l/4)⊕ r1 ⊕ r2)
ti(new) ← h(ui(new))
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
Figure 1: The Protocol
prevent Ti from receiving the last messageM3, or does
not have access to all the values r1, r2 and ui that are
needed to refresh ti, then it cannot compute the new
identifier and track future transactions.
• Server Impersonation attack: A legitimate server
responds with a messageM3 to a tag in order to enable
the tag to authenticate the server. A strong attacker
cannot create a validM3 without knowing ui, and thus
is unable to impersonate a legitimate server to Ti just
by compromising ti. However, if an attacker has access
to all the exchanged messages and knows the value of ti
used in a single authentication session, it can compute
the refreshed ui for the following session. Hence, our
protocol only resists such an attack on the assumption
that an adversary does not have access to at least one
of the values r1, M1 and M3 in an authentication ses-
sion that is performed between an authorised server
and a tag, for which the adversary knows the tag’s
secret ti.
In Table 1, we compare our protocol with the protocols
introduced in section 3 with respect to the privacy and se-
curity properties discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2. It is clear
from Table 1 that the LK scheme and the protocol proposed
in section 4 satisfy the greatest number of the privacy and
security properties.
5.2 Performance
Like the protocol described in section 4, the DPLK, CC
and LK schemes use pseudorandom number generators and
checksum algorithms to protect the integrity of messages.
We compare the storage and computation requirements of
both a server and a tag for these three protocols and the
protocol given in section 4.
Table 2 gives the storage needed in the server database
and the memory required in a tag for each of these protocols.
In the case of the database, we restrict our attention to
the storage required to support tag authentication. Table
2 indicates that the protocol given in section 4 requires the
least tag-side memory.
In order to compare the computational requirements of
the four protocols, we take into account the checksum algo-
rithms and secret updating functions that require the most
computation in each protocol. The DPLK and CC proto-
cols for the EPCglobal Gen-2 RFID tag make use of a cyclic
redundancy code (CRC) as a checksum algorithm, which is
efficient but less cryptographically strong, whereas the LK
scheme uses pseudorandom functions (PRF), and the pro-
tocol given in section 4 uses hash functions for checksum
computation and secret updating, which provide enhanced
security. Table 3 compares the number of times each such
function is computed in these protocols, under the assump-
tion that they utilise the same algorithm.
From Table 3 it follows that the protocol given in sec-
tion 4 requires fewer complex function invocations for the
tag than the other three protocols. Thus our protocol has
practical performance advantages over the DPLK, CC and
LK schemes, whilst also providing the identified privacy and
security properties.
6. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the privacy, security, and performance
requirements for RFID protocols. We have classified privacy
issues into tag information and tag location privacy, and se-
curity threats into weak and strong attacks. We have also
introduced the concept of server impersonation as a novel
type of strong attack. We have presented a new RFID au-
thentication protocol designed to meet the identified require-
ments. It has been compared with existing protocols with
respect to both its privacy and security properties and its
storage and computational requirements. The comparisons
have shown that the protocol described here is both more
secure than previously proposed schemes and has practical
advantages over them, because it provides the greatest num-
Table 1: Privacy and security properties
Property HM MW D KN DPLK CC LK Sec. 4
Information Privacy ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Location Privacy − ◦ − − ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Tag Impersonation − ◦ − ◦ − ◦ ◦ ◦
Replay attack − ◦ − − − ◦ ◦ ◦
DoS attack ◦ ◦ − − − ◦ ◦ ◦
Backward Traceability − − ◦ − − − ◦ ◦
Forward Traceability − − − − − − 4 4
Server Impersonation − − − − − − 4 4
◦ : provided
4 : provided under an assumption
− : not provided
Table 2: Storage requirements
Storage DPLK CC LK Sec. 4
Server (l + l1 + l2) ·N (l + 2l1 + 2l2) ·N 2(l + 3l3 +ml4) ·N 4l ·N
Tag l + l1 + l2 l + l1 + l2 l + l3 l
N : The number of tags
m : The maximum number of authentication failures in the LK protocol (e.g., m = 64 [15])
l : The bit-length of a tag identifier (e.g., l = 64, 96 or 128 [1, 5, 15])
l1 : The bit-length of a PIN in the DPLK and CC protocols (e.g., l1 = 32 [5])
l2 : The bit-length of a session key in the DPLK and CC protocols (e.g., l2 = 16 [5])
l3 : The bit-length of a server validator in the LK protocol (e.g., l3 = 32 [15])
l4 : The bit-length of a tag secret transmitted in the LK protocol (e.g., l4 = 32 [15])
Table 3: Computation requirements
Computation DPLK CC LK Sec. 4
On receiving the 2nd flow (k + 1)F kF (k1 + 1)F kF
Server On sending the 3rd flow 1F 1F 1F −
On updating or refreshing 1F 2F (k1 + k2 +m)F 1F
Total (k + 3)F (k + 3)F (2k1 + k2 +m+ 2)F (k + 1)F
On sending the 2nd flow 2F 1F 1F 1F
Tag On receiving the 3rd flow 1F 1F 2F 1F
On updating or refreshing 1F 2F 1F 1F
Total 4F 4F 4F 3F
F : A computationally complex function (such as a CRC, PRF or hash function)
N : The number of tags
m : The maximum number of authentication failures in the LK protocol (e.g., m = 64 [15])
n : The length of the backward key chain in the LK protocol (e.g., n = 220 [15])
k : An integer satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N
k1 : An integer satisfying 0 ≤ k1 ≤ m− 1
k2 : An integer satisfying 0 ≤ k2 ≤ n− 2
ber of identified privacy and security features and requires
the least storage and computation in a tag.
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